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Abstract
In the important contribution "All pay auctions with certain and
uncertain prizes" published in Games and Economic Behavior May
2014, Minchuk and and Sela analyze an all pay auction with multi-
ple prizes. The specic feature of the model is that all valuations
are common except for the valuation of one of the prizes, for which
contestants have private valuations. However, the equilibrium char-
acterization derived in the paper is incorrect. This note derives the
correct equilibrium of the model.
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Minchuk and Sela (2014) (hereafter MS) consider an all pay auction with
multiple prizes. The specic feature of their model is that all valuations are
common except for the valuation of one of the prizes. For this particular prize
contestants have private valuations, independently drawn from a common
distribution.
The authors claim that the equilibrium bid function is symmetric and
monotone in the valuation of the uncertain prize. However this is only the
case if the uncertain prize has the highest or lowest value. It is not if the
uncertain prize has an intermediate value, which is MSmain case.
Let me rst provide intuition for why MS result fails. I follow MS
notation. There are n contestants competing for m di¤erent prizes. The
highest bidder wins the most valuable prize, with a common value of vn.
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The second highest bidder wins the second most valuable prize vn 1 and so
on. The uncertain prize is indexed n j+1, with private value, denoted by a,
drawn independently from a distribution F () with support on [vn j; vn j+2].
Suppose now that the equilibrium bid function (a) is strictly increasing.
The probability that a player who bids according to valuation s will win the
uncertain prize is then
(n  1)!
(j   1)! (n  j)!F (s)
n j (1  F (s))j 1 :
Obviously this probability is a non-monotonic function of s, strictly increas-
ing in s for low bid levels, and strictly decreasing for high bid levels. The
probability of winning the uncertain prize reaches a maximum at a valuation
a^ implicitly determined by
F (a^) =
n  j
n  1
It follows from standard single crossing conditions1 that a strictly increas-
ing bid function on a bid segment is part of a separating equilibrium only if
the win probability is increasing in valuation as the player with a high val-
uation has a stronger incentive to bid aggressively than a bidder with a lower
valuation. In other words, a strictly increasing bid function is incompatible
with optimal bidding behavior if the probability of winning the uncertain
prize declines with the bid level in which case a bidder with a particularly
high valuation for the uncertain prize will lower her bid.
Thus, a separating equilibrium cannot be monotone in the valuation of
the uncertain prize in our setting. I will now by construction derive the
separating equilibrium.
Suppose the number of players strictly exceeds the number of prizes,
making a generalization of the result straightforward. A standard charac-
teristic of a separating equilibrium in all pay auctions with ex ante identical
contestants is the following:
 The player with the lowest possible valuation for the uncertain prize
obtains zero payo¤.
An implication of this is that the bid function must have upper support
equal to vn, the value of the highest prize. Otherwise the player with the
1For at detailed exposition see Athey (2001)
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lowest possible valuation obtains a strictly positive rent by jumping to the
upper support. As the lower support must be zero, a separating equilibrium
will be a mapping from valuation a [vn j; vn j+2] to bids  on [0; vn].2
Observe that the equilibrium can be anchored in the following observa-
tion: For high bids, the probability of winning the uncertain prize declines
as the bid level increases. Therefore, single crossing indicates that the bid
function must have a declining segment at high valuations. For low valua-
tions the equilibrium bid function must be increasing. A conjecture would
be that the equilibrium bid function has the shape illustrated in gure 1,
consisting of two bid segments: a declining segment, H(a), for those bid
levels at which the win probability (for the uncertain prize) declines with
the bid; and an increasing segment L(a) for bid levels at which the win
probability increases. A contestant with valuation a then randomizes be-
tween the two bid levels, and chooses L(a) with probability q(a). With one
exception: the contestant with the highest possible valuation for the uncer-
tain prize, a = vn j+2, bids a certain amount, corresponding to the bid level
that maximizes the probability of winning the uncertain prize. Note that the
player with the lowest possible valuation for the uncertain prize, a = vn j,
randomizes between bidding zero and vn.
Figure 1
I will now show that the separating equilibrium indeed satises this pat-
2It is also standard that the bid distribution must be atomless.
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tern. Denote by ~F ik(a) the equilibrium probability that a player with valua-
tion a wins the prize indexed i, given that she bids according to bid segment
k(a), k = L;H. The probability that this player will win the uncertain
prize, indexed n  j + 1, is then
~F n j+1L (a) = (1)
(n  1)!
(i  1)! (n  i)!
 Z a
vn j
q(z)f(z)dz
!n j  
1 
Z a
vn j
q(z)f(z)dz
!j 1
if she bids L(a)
3, and
~F n j+1H (a) = (2)
(n  1)!
(j   1)! (n  j)!
 
1 
Z a
vn j
(1  q(z)) f(z)dz
!n j  Z a
vn j
(1  q(z)) f(z)dz
!j 1
if she bids H(a).
Let us characterize the equilibrium bid functions following MSprocedure,
which is also the standard procedure. A player with valuation a behaves as
a player with valuation s in order to maximize (k = L;H)
max
s
X
i=n m+1
i 6=n j+1
~F ik(s)vi +
~F n j+1k (s)a  k(s)
The necessary conditions yields the following pair of di¤erential equations
0k(s) =
X
i=n m+1
i 6=n j+1
d ~F ik(s)
ds
vi +
d ~F n j+1k (s)
ds
a
3To see this, note that a bid s wins the prize n  j + 1 if an exact number j   1 of the
bidders contestants outbid her (note that there is a probability 1  R s
vn j
q(z)f(z)dz that
a single contestant will choose a bid above s), and the remaining n   j contestants will
bid below s.
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The rst order condition evaluated at s = a yields the candidate bid func-
tions4
k(a) = k(vn j) +
Z a
vn j
264 X
i=n m+1
i 6=n j+1
d ~F ik(x)
dx
vi +
d ~F n j+1k (x)
dx
x
375 dx
= k(vn j) +
X
i=n m+1
i 6=n j+1
~F ik(a)vi  
X
i=n m+1
i 6=n j+1
~F ik(vn j)vi +
Z a
vn j
"
d ~F n j+1k (x)
dx
#
xdx
If k = L we have L(vn j) = 0 and thus ~F
i
L(vn j) = 0, as the player loses
with certainty. If k = H we have L(vn j) = v1 and thus ~F
n
L (vn j) = 1,
as the player in this case is certain to win the most valuable prize. In both
cases, the candidate bid function is (where the second equality follows from
integration by parts)
k(a) =
X
i=n m+1
i 6=n j+1
~F ik(a)vi +
Z a
vn j
"
d ~F n j+1k (x)
dx
#
xdx
=
X
i=n m+1
i 6=n j+1
~F ik(a)vi + ~F
n j+1
k (a)a 
Z a
vn j
h
~F n j+1k (x)
i
dx
This yields associated utilities
Uk(a) =
Z a
vn j
~F n j+1k (x)dx
Thus the bidders rent is associated with a valuation of the uncertain prize
above the lower support vn j, exactly as described byMS. Note that L(vn j+2) =
H(vn j+2) since ~F
i
L(vn j+2) = ~F
i
H(vn j+2) for all i = n m+1; ::; n5, which
conrms that the two bid segments meet at a = vn j+2.
It remains to determine q(a). The equilibrium probability function, q(),
makes each contestant indi¤erent between choosing L(a) and H(a). This
4Note that ~F i(a) = ~F i(vn j) +
R a
vn j
d ~F ik(x)
dx dx.
5This can easily be checked by inserting vn j+2 in the integral limits in (1) and (2),
and generalizing to any i.
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means that we have to nd a function q() such that UL(a) = UH(a) for every
type a, thus Z a
vn j
~F n j+1L (x)dx =
Z a
vn j
~F n j+1H (x)dx (3)
must always hold. Obviously this is equivalent to the following condition:
for any a[vn j; vn j+2] we have
~F n j+1L (a) = ~F
n j+1
H (a) (4)
Hence, in a separating equilibrium, for each type a, the probability of winning
the uncertain price is independent of the choice between L(a) and H(a).
Accordingly, the net cost of submitting a high bid, H(a) L(a), cancels out
with the net gain from the higher probability of winning one of the certain
and more valuable prizes.
Substituting from (1) and (2) condition (4) can be written Z a
vn j
q(z)f(z)dz
!j 1 
1 
Z a
vn j
q(z)f(z)dz
!n j
(5)
=
 
1 
Z a
vn j
(1  q(z)) f(z)dz
!j 1 Z a
vn j
(1  q(z)) f(z)dz
!n j
which must hold for all a[vn j; vn j+2]. q() is the solution to the functional
equation given by (5). One case is particularly simple. If the uncertain prize
is the median prize, j = (n+ 1)=2, the equilibrium q is constant, q(a) = 1=2
for all a. To see this, insert q(a) = 1=2 in (5) and solve the integrals, which
yields6
1
2
F (a)
(n 1)=2
1  1
2
F (a)
(n 1)=2
=

1  1
2
F (a)
(n 1)=2
1
2
F (a)
(n 1)=2
6An intuitive argument for existence more generally goes as follows: note that the
equilibrium condition has a recursive structure in that (5) determines q() up to any
arbitrary a0, independent of the shape of q() above a0. Furthermore since ~Fn j+1L (a) =
~Fn j+1H (a) is an identity, their derivatives are equal, d ~F
n j+1
L (a)=da = d
~Fn j+1H (a)=da,
and since d ~Fn j+1L (a)=da is proportional to q(a) and d ~F
n j+1
H (a)=da is proportional to
1  q(a), and given the equilibrium function q() up to a, q(a) is uniquely determined by
the condition d ~Fn j+1L (a)=da = d ~F
n j+1
H (a)=da.
6
Note that the equilibrium is fully revealing, despite the fact that players
randomize bid levels, as each pair of possible bids is unique for the players
valuation.
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